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all_states_owning_or_hosting_nuclear_weapons_shall_immediately_de-alert_them_and_commit_to_no-first-use [2019/06/22 14:54]
174.116.81.6 [1. All states owning or hosting nuclear weapons shall immediately de-alert them and commit to no-first-use.]
all_states_owning_or_hosting_nuclear_weapons_shall_immediately_de-alert_them_and_commit_to_no-first-use [2019/06/22 15:16] (current)
174.116.81.6 [De-Alerting]
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 Intermediate stance de-alerting policy: Intermediate stance de-alerting policy:
  
-Phillips and Starr [2006] noted that changing ​ from a Launch-on-Warning policy to Retaliatory-Launch-Only–After-Detonation would reduce ​the risk of accidental war from false alarms.It would not require de-alerting or verification and might be more acceptable to the US and Russia. Deterrence could be maintained. ((Alan Phillips, Steven Starr: "​Change Launch on Warning Policy"​ http://​peacemagazine.org/​archive/​v22n3p14.htm))+Phillips and Starr [2006] noted that changing ​ from a Launch-on-Warning policy to Retaliatory-Launch-Only–After-Detonation would eliminate ​the risk of accidental war from false alarms. It would not require de-alerting or verification and might be more acceptable to the US and Russia ​militaries. Deterrence could be maintained. ((Alan Phillips, Steven Starr: "​Change Launch on Warning Policy"​ http://​peacemagazine.org/​archive/​v22n3p14. ​It is suggested also that a consequence might be progress towards abolition, given an improved relationship between nuclear armed powers. ​
  
-The deterrence-only policy is promoted as being able to proceed with fewer nuclear weapons ​requirements ​and reduction ​of the current modernization plans. It would rely mainly on submarine-based missiles, would not require a time-sensitive ​retaliation ​nuclear attack, and could be supplemented by conventional and cyberattacks. It would be decoupled from the idea of immediately destroying the enemy’s nuclear forces.It would be less expensive and allow better use for funds in other endeavours. It would require much up-grading of Command, Control, and Communication networks. It still retains the deterrence doctrine, but not, according to its proponents, deterrence + war-fighting. ((The End of Nuclear Warfighting-Moving to a Deterrence only Posture-Bruce Blair Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University, 2018)) (("​Reframing the Nuclear De-Alerting Debate: Toward Maximizing Presidential Decision Time," Nuclear Threat Initiative ​ https://​www.nti.org/​analysis/​articles/​reframing-nuclear-de-alerting-debate-towards-maximizing-presidential-decision-time/​)) (("​De-Alerting Nuclear Forces,"​ Kristenssen,​ McKinzie, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. https://​thebulletin.org))+deterrence-only policy ​option ​is to proceed with fewer stockpiled ​nuclear weapons and an end of the current modernization plans. It would rely mainly on submarine-based missiles, would not require a time-sensitive ​retaliatory ​nuclear attack, and could be supplemented by conventional and cyber forces. It would be decoupled from the idea of immediately destroying the enemy’s nuclear forces. It would be less expensive and allow funding of other endeavours. It would require much up-grading of Command, Control, and Communication networks. It still retains the deterrence doctrine, but not, according to its proponents, deterrence + war-fighting. ((The End of Nuclear Warfighting-Moving to a Deterrence only Posture-Bruce Blair Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University, 2018)) (("​Reframing the Nuclear De-Alerting Debate: Toward Maximizing Presidential Decision Time," Nuclear Threat Initiative ​ https://​www.nti.org/​analysis/​articles/​reframing-nuclear-de-alerting-debate-towards-maximizing-presidential-decision-time/​)) (("​De-Alerting Nuclear Forces,"​ Kristenssen,​ McKinzie, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. https://​thebulletin.org))
  
-The arguments for maintaining alert status state that cyberattacks could still occur after de-alerting,​ and that even with a longer decision-making ​time, a president could not make a better decision in the event of a threatened or actual nuclear strike after de-alerting. This is because rapid re-altering would cause even more risk. They argue that foes would be emboldened rather than pacified ​under such conditions and that de-alerting would lead to de facto No-First-Use. They call for better cyber security, especially with modernization. They are willing to discuss ​perhaps ​eliminating ICBMs. ((Defence360,​ https://​defense360.csis.org/​bad-Idea-de-alert-u-s-icbms/,​ 2017))+The arguments for maintaining alert status state that cyberattacks could still occur after de-alerting,​ and that even with a longer decision-making ​delay, a president could not make a better decision in the event of a threatened or actual nuclear strike after de-alerting. This is because rapid re-altering would cause even more risk. They argue that foes would be emboldened rather than deterred ​under such conditions and that de-alerting would lead to de facto No-First-Use. They call for better cyber security, especially with modernization. They are willing to discuss eliminating ICBMs. ((Defence360,​ https://​defense360.csis.org/​bad-Idea-de-alert-u-s-icbms/,​ 2017))
  
-Others ​ state that under alert status, deliberate or accidental launches or attacks are too grave a risk. De-Alerting should be the First step in avoiding these. The Union of Concerned Scientists suggests simple methods for accomplishing this. (("A Simple Method for Taking US Land-Based Nuclear Missiles Off High Alert,"​ 2015      www.ucsusa.org/​safing)) ​+Others ​ state that under alert status, deliberate or accidental launches or attacks are too grave a risk. De-Alerting should ​therefore ​be the first step in avoiding these. The Union of Concerned Scientists suggests simple methods for accomplishing this. (("A Simple Method for Taking US Land-Based Nuclear Missiles Off High Alert,"​ 2015 www.ucsusa.org/​safing)) ​
  
-**NO FIRST USE-** Statements by the Red Cross and Red Crescent that there is no possible humanitarian response to any use of nuclear weapons and its call for assurance that such weapons “are never again used” ​certainly ​reinforce ​the arguments against First Use. The ICJ opinion in 1996 that said that use of nuclear weapons would be illegal in almost all conceivable situations; this also supports ​stance for  ​No-First-Use. Such arguments were also made at the Humanitarian conferences in Oslo, Nayarit, and Austria.+**NO FIRST USE-** Statements by the Red Cross and Red Crescent that there is no possible humanitarian response to any use of nuclear weapons and its call for assurance that such weapons “are never again used” reinforce arguments against First Use (and any use, ever.The ICJ opinion in 1996 stated ​that use of nuclear weapons would be illegal in almost all conceivable situations. This is consistent with policy of No-First-Use. Such arguments were also made at the Humanitarian ​(disarmament) ​conferences in Oslo, Nayarit, and Austria.
  
 De-alerting would help promote the adoption of a doctrine of No-First-Use. De-alerting would help promote the adoption of a doctrine of No-First-Use.
  
-Also essential would be confidence-building and communication with foes (eg between US and Russia) to make sure disarmament and de-alert agreements were being followed.+Also essential would be confidence-building and communication with foes (eg between US and Russia) to make sure disarmament and de-alert agreements were being followed. As Phillips and Starr have noted, however, even an unverified no launch on warning policy held by one party is safer than the current situation.
  
-At the UN General Assembly First Committee vote on the Humanitarian Pledge in 2015 the nuclear weapons states and their umbrella ​countries ​asserted “recognition of the grave humanitarian consequences of a nuclear weapons detonation” and at the same time stated ​the “security and humanitarian principles co-exist.” They suggested that the proponents of a TPNW’s ​ resolutions “do not reflect these realities and imperatives” and contribute” to increasing international divisions regarding nuclear disarmament”. ​+At the UN General Assembly First Committee vote on the Humanitarian Pledge in 2015 the nuclear weapons states and their umbrella ​allies ​asserted ​their “recognition of the grave humanitarian consequences of a nuclear weapons detonation” and at the same time stated ​that “security and humanitarian principles co-exist.” They suggested that the proponents of a TPNW’s ​ resolutions “do not reflect these realities and imperatives” and contribute to increasing international divisions regarding nuclear disarmament”. ​
  
-Their remarks reflect ​their dilemma ​in trying to relate NATO’s supposed support for the NPT and disarmament and NATO’s policy that nuclear weapons are an essential component of its deterrence ​stance. NATO will not even accept a No-First-Use ​doctrine, and several European states have US tactical nuclear weapons on their soils. (("​Folding the Nuclear Umbrella: Nuclear Allies, the NPT and the Ban Treaty"​ APLN-Toda. Policy Brief No.58 Feb.2018, Paul Meyer))+Their remarks reflect ​the dilemma ​of trying to relate NATO’s supposed support for the NPT obligations towards ​disarmament and NATO’s policy that nuclear weapons are an essential” component of its deterrence. NATO will not, to date, accept a No-First-Use ​approach, and several European states have US tactical nuclear weapons on their territory. (("​Folding the Nuclear Umbrella: Nuclear Allies, the NPT and the Ban Treaty"​ APLN-Toda. Policy Brief No.58 Feb.2018, Paul Meyer))
  
-Others deny the dichotomy between humanitarian and security goals. They point out that the risks of having nuclear weapons far outweigh any benefits, particularly in times of heightened tension, such as now. Immediate ​start on de-alerting ​as suggested by various experts, and adoption of No-First-Use policy would lessen danger of use, allow for further rational discussion and reduction of numbers of weapons, re- enforce the NPT, encourage more nations ​ to sign the TPNW, and  eliminate ​the nuclear weapons. ((Darryl Kimball- Arms Control Association "The Case for a US No-First-Use Policy,"​ https://​www.armscontrol.org/​act/​2018-10/​focus/​case-us-first-use-policy)) ((Back from the Brink The Call to Prevent Nuclear War https://​www.preventnuclearwar.org)) ((Ira Helfand, "Sheer Luck has helped us avoid nuclear war so far-now we need to take some action"​ https://​www.cnn.com/​2018/​11/​17/​opinions/​sheer-luck-has-helped-us-avoid-nuclear-war-so-far-helfand/,​ 2018))+Others deny the dichotomy between humanitarian and security goals. They point out that the risks of having nuclear weapons far outweigh any perceived ​benefits, particularly in times of heightened tension, such as now. An Immediate ​shift towards ​de-alerting,​ and adoption of No-First-Use policy would lessen danger of use, allow for further rational discussion and reduction of numbers of weapons, re- enforce the NPT, encourage more nations ​ to sign the TPNW, and  eliminate ​many nuclear weapons. ((Darryl Kimball- Arms Control Association "The Case for a US No-First-Use Policy,"​ https://​www.armscontrol.org/​act/​2018-10/​focus/​case-us-first-use-policy)) ((Back from the Brink The Call to Prevent Nuclear War https://​www.preventnuclearwar.org)) ((Ira Helfand, "Sheer Luck has helped us avoid nuclear war so far-now we need to take some action"​ https://​www.cnn.com/​2018/​11/​17/​opinions/​sheer-luck-has-helped-us-avoid-nuclear-war-so-far-helfand/,​ 2018))
  
-In June 2018 the Canadian House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence called upon the Government ”to take a leadership role within NATO in beginning the work necessary for achieving the NATO goal of creating the conditions for a world free of nuclear weapons.” Canada can perhaps work inside ​NATO, with like-minded allies, to help achieve these goals, help change some of NATO’s nuclear ​doctrine ​and promote removal of tactical weapons from its members’ territories. ((Regehr: NATO and Nuclear Disarmament-1:​NATO’s nuclear posture The Simons Foundation))+In June 2018 the Canadian House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence called upon the Government ”to take a leadership role within NATO in beginning the work necessary for achieving ​**the NATO goal of creating the conditions for a world free of nuclear weapons**.” Canada can press NATO, with like-minded allies, to help achieve these goals, help change some of NATO’s nuclear ​doctrines ​and promote removal of tactical weapons from its members’ territories. ((Regehr: NATO and Nuclear Disarmament-1:​NATO’s nuclear posture The Simons Foundation))
  
 ==== Notes ==== ==== Notes ====
all_states_owning_or_hosting_nuclear_weapons_shall_immediately_de-alert_them_and_commit_to_no-first-use.txt · Last modified: 2019/06/22 15:16 by 174.116.81.6