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all_states_owning_or_hosting_nuclear_weapons_shall_immediately_de-alert_them_and_commit_to_no-first-use [2018/11/30 15:41]
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all_states_owning_or_hosting_nuclear_weapons_shall_immediately_de-alert_them_and_commit_to_no-first-use [2018/12/06 20:19] (current)
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 Rising tensions between the US and Russia, nuclear developments in North Korea, climate change, other international conflicts, possible Cyber attacks leading to release or loss of control of nuclear weapons are major concerns. Current US threats of withdrawal from the INF treaty (and previous leaving of the ABM treaty) with subsequent loss of contact and verification abilities, might further risk accidental, mistaken or deliberate launches. Rising tensions between the US and Russia, nuclear developments in North Korea, climate change, other international conflicts, possible Cyber attacks leading to release or loss of control of nuclear weapons are major concerns. Current US threats of withdrawal from the INF treaty (and previous leaving of the ABM treaty) with subsequent loss of contact and verification abilities, might further risk accidental, mistaken or deliberate launches.
  
-Given that US and Russian ICBMs can reach the other’s countries within about 30 minutes, a  US President or Russian leader might have only about 12 minutes to decide whether to order an attack or response to an attack. Is it fair that any single human being should have to make such decision, and so quickly? Or should such a decision ever be made?+Given that US and Russian ​Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMscan reach the other’s countries within about 30 minutes, a  US President or Russian leader might have only about 12 minutes to decide whether to order an attack or response to an attack. Is it fair that any single human being should have to make such decision, and so quickly? Or should such a decision ever be made?
  
-Maintaining nuclear weapons as deterrent, either on alert or off, is the prime excuse for their possession, but also causes other countries to feel they must have their own deterrent weapons, so that we now have nine nuclear weapons states. The world once reached nearly 70,000 weapons. Although the numbers are much reduced,all nine nuclear states are either making new weapons, or modernizing them, and some even thinking of making the weapons “more usable” As noted above, at least four nuclear weapon states have weapons on high alert, and feel they should be so maintained. The deterrence doctrine is coupled with plans to use nuclear weapons if deterrence fails. In some cases it is even contemplated using nuclear weapons in response to a conventional weapons attack. Even a limited nuclear war such as might occur between India and Pakistan, using Hiroshima-sized nuclear weapons, could cause 2 billion deaths. ((Ira Helfand, Nuclear Famine "2 Billion People at risk," 2013, https://​www.ippnw.org)) ​+Maintaining nuclear weapons as deterrent, either on alert or off, is the prime excuse for their possession, but also causes other countries to feel they must have their own deterrent weapons, so that we now have nine nuclear weapons states. The world once reached nearly 70,000 weapons. Although the numbers are much reduced, all nine nuclear states are either making new weapons, or modernizing them, and some even thinking of making the weapons “more usable” As noted above, at least four nuclear weapon states have weapons on high alert, and feel they should be so maintained. The deterrence doctrine is coupled with plans to use nuclear weapons if deterrence fails. In some cases it is even contemplated using nuclear weapons in response to a conventional weapons attack. Even a limited nuclear war such as might occur between India and Pakistan, using Hiroshima-sized nuclear weapons, could cause 2 billion deaths. ((Ira Helfand, Nuclear Famine "2 Billion People at risk," 2013, https://​www.ippnw.org)) ​
  
 Other arguments note, in spite of persistent efforts in the command and control systems, the many near misses or actual accidents that actually have occurred over the years, such as  the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Able Archer close call in 1983, the near-launch when a practice tape was played in the US in error, the research flight from Norway in 1995 which the Russians thought was a nuclear weapons attack and the proposed response was only prevented by a brave Russian. Other numerous near calamities are recorded in the book of about 500 pages, ”Command and Control,” by Eric Schlosser ((Eric Schlosser Command and Control Penguin Press 2013)) Other arguments note, in spite of persistent efforts in the command and control systems, the many near misses or actual accidents that actually have occurred over the years, such as  the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Able Archer close call in 1983, the near-launch when a practice tape was played in the US in error, the research flight from Norway in 1995 which the Russians thought was a nuclear weapons attack and the proposed response was only prevented by a brave Russian. Other numerous near calamities are recorded in the book of about 500 pages, ”Command and Control,” by Eric Schlosser ((Eric Schlosser Command and Control Penguin Press 2013))
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 Phillips and Starr [2006] noted that changing ​ from a Launch-on-Warning policy to Retaliatory-Launch-Only–After-Detonation would reduce the risk of accidental war from false alarms. It would not require de-alerting or verification and might be more acceptable to the US and Russia. ​ Deterrence could be maintained. ((Alan Phillips, Steven Starr: "​Change Launch on Warning Policy"​ http://​peacemagazine.org/​archive/​v22n3p14.htm)) Phillips and Starr [2006] noted that changing ​ from a Launch-on-Warning policy to Retaliatory-Launch-Only–After-Detonation would reduce the risk of accidental war from false alarms. It would not require de-alerting or verification and might be more acceptable to the US and Russia. ​ Deterrence could be maintained. ((Alan Phillips, Steven Starr: "​Change Launch on Warning Policy"​ http://​peacemagazine.org/​archive/​v22n3p14.htm))
  
-The deterrence only policy is promoted as being able to proceed with fewer nuclear weapons requirements and reduction of the current modernization plans .It would rely mainly on submarine based missiles, would not require a time-sensitive retaliation nuclear attack, and could be supplemented by conventional and cyber attacks. It would be decoupled from the idea of immediately destroying the enemy’s nuclear forces. It would be less expensive and allow better use for funds in other endeavours. It would require much up-grading of C3 networks. It still retains the deterrence doctrine , but not, according to its proponents, deterrence +war-fighting. ((The End of Nuclear Warfighting-Moving to a Deterrence only Posture-Bruce Blair Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University, 2018)) (("​Reframing the Nuclear De-Alerting Debate: Toward Maximizing Presidential Decision Time," Nuclear Threat Initiative ​ https://​www.nti.org/​analysis/​articles/​reframing-nuclear-de-alerting-debate-towards-maximizing-presidential-decision-time/​)) (("​De-Alerting Nuclear Forces,"​ Kristenssen,​ McKinzie, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. https://​thebulletin.org))+The deterrence only policy is promoted as being able to proceed with fewer nuclear weapons requirements and reduction of the current modernization plans. It would rely mainly on submarine based missiles, would not require a time-sensitive retaliation nuclear attack, and could be supplemented by conventional and cyber attacks. It would be decoupled from the idea of immediately destroying the enemy’s nuclear forces. It would be less expensive and allow better use for funds in other endeavours. It would require much up-grading of C3 networks. It still retains the deterrence doctrine, but not, according to its proponents, deterrence +war-fighting. ((The End of Nuclear Warfighting-Moving to a Deterrence only Posture-Bruce Blair Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University, 2018)) (("​Reframing the Nuclear De-Alerting Debate: Toward Maximizing Presidential Decision Time," Nuclear Threat Initiative ​ https://​www.nti.org/​analysis/​articles/​reframing-nuclear-de-alerting-debate-towards-maximizing-presidential-decision-time/​)) (("​De-Alerting Nuclear Forces,"​ Kristenssen,​ McKinzie, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. https://​thebulletin.org))
  
 The arguments for maintaining alert status state that cyber attack could still occur after de-alerting,​ that even with a longer decision-making time, a president could not make a better decision in the event of a threatened or actual nuclear strike after de-alerting,​ because of even more risk from rapid re-alerting. They state that foes would be emboldened rather than pacified under such conditions and that de-alerting would lead to de facto NO-First-USE. They call for better cyber security, especially with modernization. They are willing to discuss perhaps eliminating ICBMs. ((Defence360,​ https://​defense360.csis.org/​bad-Idea-de-alert-u-s-icbms/,​ 2017)) The arguments for maintaining alert status state that cyber attack could still occur after de-alerting,​ that even with a longer decision-making time, a president could not make a better decision in the event of a threatened or actual nuclear strike after de-alerting,​ because of even more risk from rapid re-alerting. They state that foes would be emboldened rather than pacified under such conditions and that de-alerting would lead to de facto NO-First-USE. They call for better cyber security, especially with modernization. They are willing to discuss perhaps eliminating ICBMs. ((Defence360,​ https://​defense360.csis.org/​bad-Idea-de-alert-u-s-icbms/,​ 2017))
all_states_owning_or_hosting_nuclear_weapons_shall_immediately_de-alert_them_and_commit_to_no-first-use.txt · Last modified: 2018/12/06 20:19 by 209.171.88.76